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BOOK REVIEWS
BACKBONE OF THE HERRING. By Curtis Bok. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
New York, 1941. Pp. xi, 302. Price: $3.00.
Mr. Clifton Fadiman writes in sparkling fashion in the October num-,
ber of Harpers about the business of one who reviews books. Inter alia,
he points out the incontrovertible fact that a reviewer cannot be really
objective in commenting upon the book of a friend. "If the book has anything to it at all", says Mr. Fadiman, "he is really dealing with the friend
himself." One may doubt the universality of the quoted statement. There
are books and books with something to them, where the living person that
is the writer is pretty far in the shadow of his printed words. Backbone of
the Herring is not one of them. But one more word from Fadiman before
we get to that. He ends his discussion about objectivity with a choice
dictum from an unnamed but forthright commentator who is reported as
stating: "Any reviewer who won't praise a friend's book is a louse."
As of course he is.
Backbone of the Herring is not a fish story. Instead it is about a
judge named Ulen; the piscatorial reference comes from the judicial oath
of the Isle of Man.1 This judge had, as judges do, many experiences.
The Governor appointed him to the bench and at the next general election
the judge had to run for office. In the meantime, he heard a good many
cases, saw a great many people. Some of the things they did were very
funny and other things that happened to them were very sad. Ulen saw
them, heard them and thought about them. In this book appear both the
account of some of these experiences and his reflections thereon.
Someone has called Judge Bok's book autobiographical. It is, and it
is not. It is not, in the sense of being a written history of a life, related
by the liver. It is, in the sense that here is a man, who happens to occupy
a seat on a judge's bench, revealing through description, anecdote and
narrative his own measure of values, his own reaction to the push and
pressure of the cosmos, his own estimate of the function of the occupant
of the judicial post in the affairs of men. The method is sharply effective,
many times more so than the point by point enunciation of a credo. The
result is a highly self-revealing book: to me poignantly and charmingly so.
But I make no pretense of objectivity on this phase of it.
Many of the judicial adventures of Judge Ulen have appeared locally
in The Shingle.2 The preparation of these little essays doubtless was the
immediate cause of the book. But even the constant reader of The Shingle
has not read Backbone of the Herring. Some of the choicest parts appear
now for the first time. And the reading of the compact collection rather
than the occasional segments makes the impression of the author's piece of
work immeasurably sharper.
There are eighteen segments to the book; they cannot be called chapters. Like a judge's professional life, they cover a wide variety of human
experience. All of them are interesting, some are touching, others profound. I was particularly moved by the first, on Ulen's induction into
office; the sixth, in which the girl, Artema, gives up a baby she had adopted
i. "You swear to do justice between cause and cause as equally as the backbone
of the herring doth lie midmost of the fish."
2. Published monthly by the Philadelphia Bar Association.
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because the child's Mother wanted her baby back; and the last, which
describes Ulen on election day. This one is perhaps, fittingly enough, the
high point of the entire collection. But others might find the "Dark
Stream" the most important. It tells of a humble little man whose one
revolt against circumstance was to poison his nagging mother-in-law and
who was found out in the course of the arsenic ring investigation. But one
need not make choices; he can enjoy them all.
Ulen is a lawyer, and is proud of his craft: But Ulen does not think of
justice in the abstract nor of the law in a vacuum. He is interested in its
operation and the living people for whom it is made, in a society which
they have created. It is a good thing to have a Ulen on the bench. I like
a judge who knows that animals understand little girls who are too young
to remember, as well as the rule in Shelley's Case or the rights of a holder
in due course.
Herbert F. Goodrich.t
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TAXATION. By Paul W. Bruton. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 1941. Pp. xxiv, 1228. Price: $6.50.
This large book, exceeding by one hundred fifty pages Magill and
Maguire's latest edition, and by five hundred pages Professor Rottschaefer's
third edition of his Cases on Taxation, is divided into two parts. The first,
comprising over four hundred pages, deals with "Constitutional Limitations" on the taxing power, and the second, "Tax Structure and Administration", gives detailed consideration to Property Taxes, Death and Gift
Taxes, and to the Federal Income Tax. A short chapter on "General
Problems of Tax Administration" concludes the book. Part One is an
unusually comprehensive survey, including not only those subjects ordinarily considered in a course on taxation, such as the permissible purposes of taxation, requirements of uniformity and equality in tax laws,
retroactive and confiscatory taxes, and jurisdiction to tax; but also the
restrictions on the tax powers of the federal and state governments due to
our peculiar federal system and the limitations on the tax powers of the
states imposed by the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Professor Bruton realizes that the offering of such an amount of constitutional material may impinge seriously on the course on constitutional
law and offers suggestions as to possible omissions. In spite of the logical
symmetry of Professor Bruton's division of his subject and of the excellent
materials collected, the reviewer doubts the advisability of the arrangement. Might not the student with some cause become impatient with a
four hundred page constitutional preface to the study of the actual operation of the tax laws themselves? Secondly, constitutional law should, your
reviewer believes, be presented as a composite whole and not be divided
among several segments, such as taxation, public utilities, labor relations
and the like. The last decade has taught us that constitutional interpretation is not so much a process of logical deduction from the phrases of the
Constitution, as it is an evolutionary process depending primarily on the
Court's fundamental notions as to the proper functions of the judiciary
and of the law and government itself. The true effect of these factors
cannot be realized by distributing the study of constitutional law among
several different courses. Lastly, some of the constitutional problems which
must inevitably be considered in the course on taxation, such as that of

i-Associate in Law, University of Pennsylvania; Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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jurisdiction to tax, and that of the retroactive tax, can, it is believed, best
be comprehended when the student has become acquainted with the operation of the tax laws under normal circumstances. Professor Bruton has
recognized this to an extent, for although retroactive gift and income taxes
are considered in Part One, Coolidge v. Long,1 involving a retroactive
inheritance tax, is postponed until Chapter 6, which deals with death taxes
specifically.
The material on the general property tax is not as extensive as that
on death duties and the income tax, nor are the notes as full as in other
portions of the book. The usual topics, however, are considered with
chief consideration paid to the troublesome problem of valuation. Your
reviewer likes the excellent collection of cases on special assessments for
improvements. He regrets, however, that more adequate consideration
was not paid to the problem of state taxation of utilities which operate as
a unit in several different jurisdictions. Also the property exemption
statutes are treated but sketchily and that by but one case in the last chapter
of the book.
Beginning with inheritance taxes, Professor Bruton shows his mettle,
and one feels that he is dealing with a subject which the author regards
of greater interest and importance. In this chapter are taken seriatim the
different types of taxable transfers. Representative statutes are printed,
and there is a good collection of case material. The gift tax is properly
considered here, for, as the Supreme Court has pointed out in Sanford's
Estate v. The Commissioner,2 the gift tax is in essence ancillary to the
inheritance tax. There is also a good section devoted to the valuation of
estates for the purpose of the death tax and to allowable deductions.
The reviewer has always found the teaching of the income tax to be
the most difficult as well as the most interesting part of the tax course.
Professor Bruton's plan is to present first the general problem of what
constitutes taxable income. This is subdivided into two parts: (a) Taxability of a Receipt as Affected by Its Source, and (b) Taxability of a
Receipt as Affected by Its Form. Then more detailed consideration is
given to two particular types of income, those from sales of capital assets
and those from corporate distributions. Then come in order: Deductions;
Personal Exemptions and Credits for Dependents; Taxable Periods and
Accounting Methods; and lastly, The Taxable Person. In this section are
considered Assignments, Trusts and Estates, Partnerships and Business
Associations. In general this seems a logical and desirable approach,
though the analysis of what constitutes taxable income into its component
parts is a baffling problem. The categories that any editor may choose
seem obsessed to overlap, and cases placed in one section lie with equal
propriety in another. Thus, in Professor Bruton's collection, cases dealing
with the taxation of income from trust funds are found both in the section
dealing with taxation as affected by the form of the receipt and in the
section dealing with the taxable person. Since Professor Bruton has very
commendably prefaced most of his sections and subsections with quotations from the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the
reviewer would like to have seen the section on what constitutes taxable
income open with the quotation of Section 22 (a) of the Code, and with
the case of Eisner v. Macomber,' which, -entirely apart from its specific
holding, has the best general discussion of the subject to be found any1.

282 U. S. 582 (1931), Bruton, p. 621

2. 308 U. S. 39 (1939), Bruton, p. 656.

3. 252 U. S. 189 (i92o), Bruton, p. 838.
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where. The cases dealing with types of receipts not constituting incomegifts, property acquired from a decedent, capital contributions-are excellent. Frank v. Commissioner,4 a Board of Tax Appeals decision of
1927, in view of section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code later enacted and
simply cited in the footnote, and the recent case of Helvering v. Enright's
Estate,5 decided since Bruton's Cases went to print, gives a wrong impression as to the taxability of income accrued to a decedent, but not collected
until after his death by his personal representative.
The section dealing with income from sale or disposition of capital
assets is devoted entirely to quotations from the Internal Revenue Code
and to cases dealing with corporate stock. Should there not be cases on
the necessity, in ascertaining the profit from a sale, of deducting from cost
accrued depreciation? Also, cases on the proper basis of property acquired
from a decedent would be interesting and appropriate.
Professor Bruton's material on income from corporate distributions
is the best of any that the reviewer has examined. The extremely complicated provisions of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with corporate
reorganizations are given substantially in full, and one simple case exemplifying their operation is printed. From experience the reviewer has
learned that this is insufficient to present this difficult topic to students.
Could not the problem be met by the use of several hypothetical problems
illustrating the various types of reorganizations coming within the operation
of this particular section of the Code? The remaining sections of the
chapter on Income Taxes, which have been listed above, are very adequate
presentations of those respective subjects.
It is difficult to present a comprehensive picture of the federal income
tax through case material alone, largely because many of its fundamentals
involve primarily accounting and not legal principles. While Professor
Bruton's collection is as inclusive as any in the field, it is believed that the
treatment of the subject would be more valuable had it included some
material on such characteristic subjects as inventories, long term contracts,
installment sales, "wash sales" and sales between members of the same
family and between a stockholder and the corporation he controls. Teachable adjudicated cases on these subjects are difficult to find, but it is
hazarded again that the pedagogical problem might be met by printing the
sections of the Internal Revenue Code involved with hypothetical problems
to illustrate their operation. Unless this is done, the subject is in danger
of being inadequately treated.
There are several admirable features of Professor Bruton's Cases that
single his book out from others in the field. Taxation is essentially a subject of statutory interpretation, a fact that the student needs to have constantly impressed upon him. The compiler of this casebook has done
exceedingly well in prefacing each section of his book with quotations from
the representative federal and state statutes involved, quite often with a
short history of the legislative development. Professor Bruton also does
well in prefacing the chapters on death duties and on the income tax with
brief comprehensive surveys of the respective tax systems involved, including tables of the rates of taxation and in the case of the income tax a
sample return. Something of this is also done on the various sections in
the chapter on the general property tax. He also gives valuable aids to the
student by explaining briefly the nature of insurance and of powers of
appointment when these institutions become involved with the govern4. 6 B. T. A. i07i (I927), Bruton, p. 837.
5. 312 U. S. 636 (I94i).
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ment's taxing power. Professor Bruton's collection of materials also far
exceeds its competitors in the use of non-judicial material gathered from
law review articles, governmental reports and standard treatises. This is
most desirable. Taxation is a subject not only for the lawyer but also for
the accountant and the tax economist. In the course on taxation the often
mentioned desideratum of the union of law with the social sciences finds
apt exemplification. The use of excerpts from Arthur Kent's article on
capital gains (Bruton, 919) and from Bonbright's valuable treatise on the
valuation of property (Bruton, 458, 466, 474, 486) is much to be commended. It is believed that the practice could be extended with profit, to
the end that the tax lawyer might be acquainted not only with judicial
interpretations on the tax statutes, but with some of the fundamental principles held by the economist as to the proper bases for taxation, and as to
the defects and advantages of the various schemes of raising public revenue
through taxation. Notably in the present, both law and economics
contribute to the shaping of our taxation system, and of both fields the
lawyer, as a public servant, should be advised. Professor Bruton's book
is an important step in this direction.
Ray A. Brown.t
JusTicE iN GREY.

By William M. Robinson, Jr. Harvard University

Press, Cambridge, 1941. Pp. xxi, 73. Price: $7.50.
It was Judge W. Walter Braham, speaking before the Pennsylvania
Bar Association, on June 26, 1941, who called attention to the "Position of
the Lawyer in a Changing World". He told us that the lawyer, apart from
participation in defense activities, stands ready to fill a special role which
awaits him when the world strife draws to a close, a role in a changing
world which cannot be performed by autocrat or labor leader, by diplomat
or economist, by industrial expert or military genius. It will be, nay now
is, the task of the legal profession to take thought for the day after tomorrow and the reconstruction of the institutions of justice, order, and permanent peace.1
William M. Robinson, Jr., in his timely volume of 70o pages, Justice
in Grey, gives the results of a scholarly study of the judicial system of the
Confederacy, presented in a dispassionate manner. This history of the
opening, the operation, and the closing of the local and federal courts of
the Confederate States of America, portrays, in documented form, the
results of a great experiment of lawyers and judges in the changing world
of some eighty years ago.
Somewhere in this brief record may be found mention of the yielding
by President Lincoln to the importunities of Attorney General Speed and
Secretary of War Stanton, and to his withdrawal of the permission already
granted to the General Assembly -of the repentant State of Virginia to
meet for the purpose of restoring it to normal relations with the victorious
United States.2 The lawyers in that day just failed to prevent the horrors
of the period of reconstruction.
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
i. Address before the 47th Annual Meeting of the Penna. Bar Assn. at Bedford
Springs, Penna., by Hon. W. Walter Braham, President Judge of the Court of Common

Pleas of Lawrence County, Penna. Text of address will appear in forthcoming annual
volume of the Pa. Bar Assn. and may be found in the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer,
July II, 1941, p. 55.

2. Page 59i. The assurance was given to Gustavus Myers, a Richmond lawyer,
and to the Confederate Acting Secretary of War, John A. Campbell.
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It is still too soon for us to attempt to appraise the extent to which the
failure of the Treaty of Versailles indicates the missing of an opportunity
on the part of the American lawyer. But there is an immediate task confronting the lawyers of this country, in helping to shape the institutions of
justice, order and permanent peace in the changed world which will arise
the day after tomorrow.
As the American Bar Association, or other organized group of lawyers, accepts this assignment-, here will be found, ready at hand, a brief,
unhurried history of the changes in the judicial system of thirteen states
when the Confederacy, without a break in continuity, took over the administration of justice; and also an account of the almost complete disruption
which occurred, four years later, when the United States reasserted its
responsibility for justice, order and peace.
The author of Justice in Grey tells us:
"So smooth was the transition that writs issued by United States
Authority were returned to Confederate courts and the judgments
were executed by Confederate marshals. Indictments returned by
United States grand juries were tried by Confederate petit juries, and
persons convicted of offenses against the United States were imprisoned at Confederate expense."
The suddenness of the changes occurring at the collapse of the southern arms is well portrayed by Mr. Robinson in describing the last case
decided by the District Court for the Southern Division of Alabama, in
April, 1865: 4
"On April 3, 1865, Judge Jones held a special term of the court for
the southern division of the District of Alabama, on the admiralty
side, for the trial of the salvage case Michael L. Martin v. Six Bales
of Derelict Cotton, Josaf Kaufman, Claimant. On that day the enemy,
who had been so long down the Bay as to be taken for granted, closed
in and completely invested the defenses of Mobile. The court continued to sit amid the uncomfortably close roar of land and naval
artillery of both the blue and the grey. On the fourth day it reached
its decision and made a judgment in favor of the salvors. The claimant was given ten days within which to pay $4oo on pain of having
his cotton sold by the marshal. By the time that this period of grace
was half expired the unbelievable had happened: the Confederate
military and naval forces were withdrawing up the Alabama River,
leaving the city, with its handsome customhouse and seat of the federal court, to hostile occupation."
Broadly speaking, the restored regime treated as a legal nullity the
events, in the South, of the four years interruption of justice as understood
in the North. Speaking of Georgia: I
"The Constitution of 1868 forced upon the people of Georgia the idea
of rebellion. The Constitution of 1865 had referred to the conflict as
the war against the United States. Now the State, prostrate and at
the point of the bayonet, was forced to refer to its late rebellion. Furthermore, contracts made during the Confederate regime but not completed, 'and judgments and decrees not fully executed or performed',
3. Page 624.
4. Page 589.
5. Page 6o5.
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were impaired; and the post-bellum contracts which were in renewal
of a debt existing prior to June I, 1865, were outlawed except as to
seven reserved classes of debt. Congress was not satisfied with these
provisions, and by act of June 25, i868, forced an amendment to the
Constitution of Georgia which was intended to wipe out all contracts
and obligations of Confederate origin. But in some way a provision
slipped by the Reconstructionists recognizing, by implication at least,
the inviolability of proceedings in the Confederate States district court,
unless the same were attacked for fraud or unless otherwise declared
invalid by the Constitution."
The text of limited recognition of the validity of judicial proceedings
is furnished by Mr. Robinson: 6
"Art. XI, section 5: 'All rights, privileges, and immunities which
may have vested in, or accrued to, any person or persons, or corporations, in his, her, or their right, or in any fiduciary capacity, under
any act of any legislative body sitting in this State as such, or of any
decree, judgment, or order of any court, sitting in this State, under
the laws then of force and operation therein, and recognized by the
people as a court of competent jurisdiction, since the 19 th day of
January, 1861, shall be held inviolate by all the courts of this State,
unless attacked for fraud, or unless otherwise declared invalid by, or
according to, this constitution.' (McElreath, A Treatise on the Constitution of Georgia, pp. 344-345. The italics are mine.)"
We close this readable volume in the knowledge that others will
peruse its pages and find therein a partial answer to the challenge of Gone
With the Wind. The experience of these four years remains as a permanent part of the heritage of the American lawyer in this ever changing
world.
Albert Smith Faught.t

THE LAW OF PICKETING IN PENNSYLVANIA.

By M. Herbert Syme.

Joseph M. Mitchell, Philadelphia, 1941. Pp. 52. Price: $1.5o.
Picketing has been used as a weapon by labor unions to achieve higher
wages, lower hours, and better working conditions from the very inception of the trade union movement. Despite the prevalence of this practice,
few attorneys, let alone laymen, know the legal incidents of picketing.
In these times when the labor union has become an accepted part of
the American scene, all attorneys should at least have a "working knowledge" of the history and present state of the law relating to one of the
chief weapons of trade unions. It is to the vast majority of attorneys, who
do not possess this requisite "worldng knowledge", that this monograph
is recommended.
The author gives the reader a detailed historical presentation of the
right of picketing and of the treatment accorded persons engaged in picketing by the courts. He takes us from the period when any combined effort
6. Page 6o6, note 9.
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to improve working conditions was regarded as a criminal conspiracy up
to the present-day efforts to afford to trade unions full opportunity to make
known their side of a dispute. In presenting us with this detailed study
of one state the author, in reality, gives us a typical picture of what transpired in other states, since what occurred in Pennsylvania closely paralleled that which occurred elsewhere.
Of course, this author writes from a point of view. Anything written
on a field of law still in a state of flux would be valueless unless written
from a definite point of view. The author being general counsel for the
Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, it is understandable that he sees the
picture through labor's eyes.
The main criticism to be levelled at the author's treatment of the law
of picketing is that not enough emphasis is placed upon the Thornhill,'
Carson,2 Swing,' and Meadovrmoor 4 cases. It is generally accepted by
students of labor law that, by placing picketing within the orbit of freedom
of speech, the right to picket has been freed from the complicated rules
heretofore used to determine whether or not picketing was lawful. 5 It is
the thought of the reviewer thai: the historical background should have been
explained and interpreted in the light of this new development.
On the whole this monograph affords the reader an excellent survey
of the law of picketing in Pennsylvania, presented in a most interesting
manner- Its weakness, if weakness it is in view of the recency of the
Swing case, is its failure to adequately appraise the effect of this doctrine on
the law of picketing.
Erwin Lerten.t
i. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 "U. S. 88 (194o).
2. Carlson v. California, 30 U. S. io6 (i94o).

3. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
4. Milkwagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (I941).
5. For a discussion of the effect of these cases see Note, Peacefd Picketing and
the Constitutional Guarantee of Free Speech Since the Swing Case (194i) 9o U. oF
PA. L. R . 2O, supra in this issue.
t Member of the Bar, Philadelphia.

